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ABSTRACT
Drawing on interviews with 12 young adults in the Danish digital labor market, this article investi-
gates how young workers on digital labor platforms experience the tension between ‘algorithmic 
management’ and autonomy. Digital labor platforms promise autonomy to workers, but the study 
shows that the platforms in varying degrees exert control over the labor process in different stages 
of the work. The inherent non-transparency of the algorithmic management systems makes it dif-
ficult for the young workers to understand the underlying mechanisms of the platforms. While the 
young workers’ autonomy in some important ways is restricted by the algorithmic management 
systems, the young workers have all chosen the platform work because they feel that it allows 
them to control where and when they work. We propose the conceptualization ‘the double au-
tonomy paradox of young workers’ to describe this phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
The digital revolution is continuously giving rise to new ways of working via digital platforms. It is predominantly young people taking up this type of work (Garben 2017; Popescu et al. 2018) within what is broadly termed the ‘gig economy’ (How-
croft & Bergvall-Kåreborn 2019). Work in the gig economy resembles temporary and 
‘nonstandard’ forms of employment (Garben 2017) and must be viewed in the light of 
recent transformations of employment and the labor market at large, whereby work 
is characterized by greater volatility, uncertainty and precarity (Antonucci et al. 2014; 
1  You can find this text and its DOI at https://tidsskrift.dk/njwls/index.
2  Corresponding author: Cæcilie Sloth Laursen (E-mail: cael@itu.dk) is currently employed as a PhD 
fellow at the IT University of Copenhagen. She was employed at Aalborg University while the research 
for this article was carried out.
66 Young  Workers on Digital Labor Platforms Cæcilie Sloth Laursen et al.
Casas-Cortes 2014; Kalleberg 2009; MacDonald & Giazitzoglu 2019). Furthermore, 
digital platform work is, much like traditional work among youths (Nielsen et al. 2013, 
2019; Tannock 2003), characterized by the work being delivered ‘on-demand’ when a 
customer requests it (Altenried 2020; Berg et al. 2018; Prassl 2018). A distinguishing 
trait of gig work, however, is its mediation by digital platforms as an organizing struc-
ture (Sutherland et al. 2019) with distinct features of labor process controls (Gandini 
2019; Shapiro 2018; Veen et al. 2019). 
Although digital platforms claim to be mere facilitators of transactions between 
entrepreneurs and customers (Prassl 2018), they exert a high degree of control over 
workers, particularly through algorithms that, for instance, control the matching, rank-
ing and sorting of jobs and workers – a mechanism known as algorithmic manage-
ment (Jarrahi & Sutherland 2019; Lee et al. 2015; Möhlmann & Zalmanson 2017). An 
emerging body of literature investigating worker experiences of algorithmic manage-
ment on digital platforms has revealed an inherent ‘autonomy paradox’ in the platforms, 
as they promise autonomy to workers while never relinquishing control (Möhlmann & 
Zalmanson 2017).
This article explores algorithmic management on digital platforms operating in 
Denmark through the notions of control and autonomy. In contrast to the existing 
studies on algorithmic management, this article focuses particularly on the experiences 
of young workers. British youth researchers have argued that ‘young people are heav-
ily involved in the shift towards non-standard work and the rise of the ‘gig economy’’ 
(MacDonald & Giazitzoglu 2019, p. 734). Accordingly, similar to international trends 
(Popescu et al. 2018), in Denmark, it is often young people who take on work via digital 
labor platforms (Ilsøe & Madsen 2017).
According to MacDonald & Giazitzoglu (2019), young workers’ participation in the 
gig economy is motivated by the lack of alternative jobs. The authors describe gig work 
among British youths as a part of a precarious, insecure and long-lasting life condition. 
Compared with the rest of Europe, Denmark has relatively high levels of employment 
among young people, as well as high levels of education (European Commission 2019), 
but very little is known about young Danish workers in the gig economy. At the present 
time, the prevalence of digital platform work remains limited in the Nordic countries, 
but it is expected to grow (Ilsøe & Madsen 2017). From a Danish perspective, we know 
that young people under 30 years in general have a higher risk of accidents and injuries 
at work, and that the risk is increased for newcomers and for young people in part-
time jobs (Danish Working Environment Authority 2013; Dyreborg et al. 2018). It is 
reasonable to assume that this also characterizes work that is disseminated through 
digital labor platforms. Here, a workday often comprises many different short-term 
tasks (Standing 2016), which increase the risk of work-related injuries (Garben 2017). 
Furthermore, we know that young people with a short-term view of work attach minimal 
importance to risks (Nielsen et al. 2013). Overall, this puts young platform workers in 
a particularly vulnerable situation.
As discussed above, the digital platforms’ deployment of algorithmic management 
systems is central to the platforms’ operations and work processes. In relation to this, 
the present article seeks to answer the following question: 
How do young Danish workers on digital labor platforms experience the tension between 
algorithmic management and autonomy related to platform work?
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2 Control and autonomy
2.1 Worker autonomy and being in control
Democracy, autonomy and participation of workers in workplace decision-making 
are core values of the Nordic Labor Market model (Dyreborg 2011; Sørensen et al. 
2012). Furthermore, Nordic research traditions on working life practices emphasize 
a perspective on workers as acting and collectively involved subjects (Sørensen et al. 
2012). Autonomy in the workplace can be understood as the ability to ‘exercise a degree 
of control over the content, timing, location and performance of activities’ (Mazmanian 
et al. 2013, p. 1). Hvid et al. (2010) argue that ‘to be in control’ includes more than 
control over one’s own present work tasks, it also includes being able to influence and 
form the work context that one is a part of. One of the leading figures who has inspired 
this Nordic research tradition is Karasek (1979), who developed the internationally 
well-known demands-control model. Karasek suggests that more worker participation 
and control over their work situation leads to less stress among workers. Following this 
perspective, a number of studies find that autonomy and control in work are pivotal 
factors in worker experiences of work-related stress (Bjarte et al. 2005; Thompson et al. 
2006), burnout (Day et al. 2017), anxiety and depression (Bjarte et al. 2005), and in 
better worker health (Bond & Bruce 2003). 
In this study, we understand worker autonomy as having a sense of control of one’s 
work and some degree of power or discretion to decide how and when to perform tasks 
(Kalleberg et al. 2009; Mazmanian et al. 2013; Wheatley 2017), as well as influence over 
work context. Furthermore, we pay particular notice to Kalleberg et al.’s (2009, p. 103) 
statement that ‘[a] high degree of autonomy implies considerable freedom from control 
by technical means, rules and detailed procedures’.
2.2 Algorithmic management and control mechanisms
In stark contrast to Kalleberg and colleagues’ (2009) description of autonomy, gig 
economy platforms rely heavily on technical means for control. The platforms use 
algorithms to manage a large pool of distributed workers and to match workers with 
customers. Such algorithmic management systems often result in managerial control, 
oversight and decision-making being transferred from managers to algorithms (Duggan 
et al. 2019; Jarrahi & Sutherland 2019; Lee et al. 2015). Duggan et al. (2019) assert 
that when management is delegated to algorithms, the interpersonal and empathetic 
aspects of people management disappear, which may lead to workers losing trust and 
confidence, negatively impacting well-being in the process. 
While algorithmic management is also used in ‘offline industries’, it is an essential 
element in the operation of digital work platforms (Berg et al. 2018). From a labor 
process perspective, Gandini (2019) argues that gig economy platforms are examples of 
‘nuanced and innovative forms of technologically centred, normatively driven practices 
of control over workers and their work’. These forms of control are unique because 
they are forms of control that are: ‘embedded in the functioning of the platform and 
cannot be escaped by workers, as the ‘feeding’ of these metrics affects their income 
and continuity of employment’ (Gandini 2019, p. 1051). This form of control is 
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conceptualized as ‘techno-normative’ control of workers (Ibid). The techno-normative 
control (Gandini 2019) on digital labor platforms resembles Richard Sennett’s (1998) 
early work on ‘new capitalism’ and his descriptions of how diffuse technological 
control mechanisms confine workers’ autonomy. He suggests that the deeper logics 
of technological aids used in work processes remain illegible to workers, which often 
leaves them feeling disoriented.
Several studies find that the digital platforms’ minimal display of information to 
workers about the algorithmic management system is a key control mechanism on 
the platforms, with negative consequences for workers’ autonomy on food delivery 
platforms (Shapiro 2018; Veen et al. 2019), ride-hailing apps (Chen 2018; Lee et al. 
2015; Möhlmann & Zalmanson 2017; Rosenblat & Stark 2016), and online work 
platforms (Jarrahi & Sutherland 2019; Wood et al. 2018). However, the studies also 
report on workers acting to retain autonomy by, for instance, building algorithmic 
literacy (Jarrahi & Sutherland 2019, p. 587), or performing algorithmic activism by 
gaming the system (Chen 2018). Alongside information asymmetry, studies show how 
ratings of workers also serve as a control mechanism on the algorithmically managed 
platforms (Gandini 2019; Raval & Dourish 2016; Standing 2016; Wood et al. 2018). 
Several researchers assert that evaluation through rating systems can cause stress 
among workers (Garben 2017; Huws 2015; Jesnes et al. 2016) and have negative 
psychological impacts (Lee et al. 2015). Altenried (2020) argues that ‘digital Taylorism’ 
is a precise naming of a ‘labor regime’ where algorithmic management and surveillance, 
standardization and measuring of results and feedback are the dominating means of 
organizing the labor processes.
Viewing algorithmic management as a decentralized concentration of power (Sennett 
1998, p. 55), where management is delegated from managers to technical systems, this 
article explores young workers’ responses to algorithmic control mechanisms and 
discusses autonomy in their working environment.
3 Method, data and approach
The study is based on qualitative interviews1 with 12 young adults under age 30 
from Denmark who work in the digital labor market, and readings of the Terms 
and Conditions (TC) from different digital platforms. In 2017, 1% of the working 
population in Denmark had tried working via a digital platform, of which 36% were 
students (Ilsøe & Madsen 2017). Given the limited prevalence of platform work in 
Denmark, it proved difficult to locate participants. A purposive sampling strategy was 
applied (Bryman 2016), locating young workers from different parts of the country who 
worked on different types of platforms. Open invitations to participate in the project via 
the platforms’ own newsletters and Facebook groups were not successful. We therefore 
chose to contact the young workers through various other channels: directly through 
their profile on the digital platforms; via their contact information on the platform; 
directly via Facebook Messenger (when member of a platform Facebook group); via the 
researchers’ stakeholder network; or were approached if we saw them in the street with 
a logo or company equipment indicating affiliation with a platform. Twelve of these 33 
young people agreed to participate.
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Table 1 Overview of participants
Type of platform Number of 
interviews
Age and sex Period of 
interviews
Online digital platforms 
(WorkSome, ’Din tekst forfatter’, Freelancer)
5 2 women and 3 men
21–28 years of age
2017–2019
Location based digital platforms (Wolt, 
HandyHand, Chabber, Care, Dogley, Hilfr)
7 3 women and 4 men
19–24 years of age
2017–2019
The interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, with 
questions touching on their life situation, working routines, work organization, pay, 
social and economic risks, and working environment. 
All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim and thematically 
coded (Braun & Clarke 2006) in Nvivo 12. The coding combined deductive and 
inductive approaches, with certain pre-selected codes such as ‘physical and psychosocial 
working environment’, ‘receipt of jobs’ and ‘motivation’. Other codes were developed 
from reading the empirical data, for example ‘digital aspects of the job’, ‘affective labor’ 
and ‘time management’. The analytic code ‘digital aspect of their work’ and the sub-
code ‘algorithms’ were selected for closer investigation for this study. These two codes 
were read closely in combination with excerpts pertaining to the working environment. 
The young workers’ experiences and their speculations of the inner workings of the 
platforms became the final focus of the analysis. Although the interviews did not 
explicitly address algorithms, some participants commented on the underlying workings 
of the platforms or mentioned algorithms. Following this, the analysis investigated how 
workers experience algorithms in practice (Seaver 2017). More specifically, the analysis 
took analytic inspiration from Taina Bucher’s (2017) study of Facebook users; she takes 
a phenomenological approach, focusing on the users’ experiences and sensemaking of 
the platform algorithms. While users of digital platforms may not understand the inner 
workings of the system, they still ‘imagine, perceive and experience algorithms’ (Bucher 
2017, p. 31) and we can investigate how the users’ understandings of algorithms shape 
their actions. 
Following Bucher, the analysis is centered on the narratives2 from the young work-
ers about their experiences with the algorithmic systems on the digital work platforms. 
By studying worker experiences and sensemaking on digital labor platforms, one can 
begin to understand the performative effects of the algorithms (Kitchin 2017) in terms of 
how they create instances of control and shape workers’ actions on the platforms. In our 
findings, we specifically introduce a subset of six young workers, who find work via six 
different digital labor platforms. We include workers from different platforms because 
the platforms differ in type of work, whether the work is online or offline, as well as in 
how work is distributed among workers on the platforms.
To achieve a better understanding of the workings of the different platforms we col-
lected the TC from the different digital platforms where the young workers are signed 
up. The TC can be viewed as official documents from the platforms (Bryman 2016); these 
provided us with insights into how the platforms define the users of the platform, their 
restrictions, and their division of responsibilities. Table 2 provides an overview of the six 
platforms and workers. 
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Indicators of autonomy: 
responsibilities of taking in bids, 










Workers set a price for the service.
The workers are contacted by customers 
and cannot bid on tasks themselves.
Ditte, 24.
Student at the university. To 
earn some extra money, she 
takes tasks as a dog walker. 
‘Hilfr’
Cleaning
The workers set a price for the service.
The workers cannot bid on tasks 
themselves. 
Customers can book the worker for 
cleaning jobs by selecting a day and time. 
The worker can then accept, reject, or 
suggest another day for the job.
Hans, 22 years old.
Bachelor’s student, who 
provides cleaning services as 






The customer determines the duration of 
a job and the hourly wage, (the customer 
must comply with existing collective 
agreements). Chabber pays workers their 
salary monthly and deducts taxes. They 
take a fee of 4.81 Euro for each shift a 
worker has (Chabber n.d.).
Charlotte, 24 years old.
Works as a waiter as a 
source of income while 




The workers download a Wolt partner 
app on their smartphones. Here they sign 
up for shifts within a specific timeframe, 
during which time they earn a minimum 
hourly wage of €14.70. Or they can log 
on anytime and be paid per delivery.
Viktor, 19 years old.
High school student, works 










both online and 
local jobs.
Workers set their own price.  Worksome 
suggests jobs for the workers, but the 
workers are not required to accept. 
Worksome may inform workers why they 
are rejected for work, e.g., due to price. 
On completion of a job, Worksome sends 
an invoice to the company (the customer) 
on behalf of the worker.  Worksome takes 
a fee of 4% for each payment  
(Worksome 2019).
Vera, 27 years old.
Graduated from university.
Solo self-employed.
Takes on communication 
and promotion tasks as a 
source of income, while she 





The customer posts a task, and the 
workers submit bids. The customer can 
also encourage workers they deem 
qualified to apply. 
Freelancer takes a fee of 10% for each 




Takes on translation tasks as 
a source of income, while he 
is starting out on his own.
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4 Findings
On reading the young workers’ narratives and the TC we found how the control 
mechanisms across the various digital platforms are embedded in the different stages 
of the labor process. The presented findings therefore adopt a temporal structure and 
indicate how workers experience and react to different control mechanisms implemented 
before they are booked for a task, during the performance of the work and after 
completion of a task. Afterward, we link these findings to the young workers’ overall 
experience of working via a digital platform.
4.1  Control within the matching process: workers’ experiences of 
non-transparency 
Digital work platforms serve as an intermediary by matching customers seeking the 
performance of a service or task with workers willing to deliver this work. Most platforms 
exercise some degree of control in the matching process, such as ranking workers based 
on different parameters, or not displaying all tasks to all workers (Meploy 2019; Wood 
et al. 2018). The platforms thus do not operate as ‘free’ marketplaces when exercising 
elements of control that condition the availability of tasks to workers, and workers’ 
chances of getting booked for work (Prassl 2018). In this way, the platforms exercise 
control in the process before the workers secure a task.
For most of the young workers in our study, the parameters determining how they 
managed to secure work and how they were ranked compared to other workers were 
non-transparent and seemingly arbitrary: 
Ditte:  I would like for them to have a more manageable website. For example, 
I cannot find myself if I search for dog walkers. When I’m not logged into 
the system, I find it really difficult to locate my profile because there are so 
many takers, you know? I think it’s a very big search engine that is very 
unclear when you’re not logged in.
Interviewer:  Do you have any idea how they rank people?
Ditte:  No, that’s the thing. I have no idea. I wonder if it has anything to do with 
the stars [scoring system], but that’s not the sense I’m getting. It just seems 
so random how they find a dog walker. 
Ditte expressed confusion about how customers located her profile and selected her from 
the dozen or so other dog walkers in her area of the city. After a walk, the dog owner 
can evaluate the dog walker by assigning stars and writing a review. Yet, Ditte remained 
uncertain as to whether this influenced her ranking compared to other dog walkers. 
While Ditte was satisfied with the number of gigs she received through the platform, she 
still expressed a desire for greater transparency. The workers on Dogley and Hilfr cannot 
bid on tasks themselves. The workers set a price for their service, upload a photo, write a 
short text about themselves, and reply to questions quickly, all in the hope of becoming 
visible to customers. However, the basis for their ranking on the platform is inaccessible 
to them and it remains uncertain if they will secure any tasks, which makes their work-
life and income unpredictable or ‘random’ as Ditte put it.
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Another example is 26-year-old solo self-employed Frederic, who had gained some 
understanding of how the ranking system on the platform Freelancer functions. Frederic 
took on translation tasks on Freelancer as a source of income while he was trying to kick-
start his own company. On Freelancer, customers post a task and then workers submit 
bids. The customers can also encourage workers they deem qualified to apply. When 
Frederic bid on a task, the algorithm ranked him in relation to the other freelancers who 
bid on the same task. Frederic learned that the algorithm on Freelancer determined his 
placement by calculating a wide range of factors:
Interviewer: So how are the bids ordered? Is it the one who has bid the lowest price?
Frederic:  It is similar to when Google ranks web pages in the Google search engine. It 
is an algorithm of different values. And it is how big your turnover is, which 
is probably the most important factor. Then comes your number of reviews 
and your average rating. And this is weighted in a certain way. 
Similar to the workers in Jarrahi and Sutherland’s (2019) study, Frederic dedicated energy 
towards making sense of the algorithm on the platform that determined his ranking 
when he bid on a task. He thereby learned which factors the algorithm prioritized 
highest in his ranking.
When Frederic first started working on the platform, he took tasks at a low rate to 
establish a better ranking by the algorithm:
Frederic:  I started bidding in there [on Freelancer] and steadily working my way up. It 
quickly became clear that you have to lower your offers in order to get some 
reviews. Because I didn’t get any jobs on any of the tasks I bid on. Then 
I started bidding lower (…). And I got the job and that really kick-started 
things for me. Because, as I said, the algorithm states that the bigger your 
turnover on the platform is, the better your ranking and score will be. 
Frederic quickly learned that he had to alter his tactics and accept tasks at a low rate in 
order to get further tasks and a higher score on the platform. Gillespie (2014, p. 184) 
describes how users on social media platforms are strategic about how they post 
content to become ‘algorithmically recognizable’, which amplifies their visibility and 
the impact of their efforts. Fredric took similar strategic actions to become recognized 
by the algorithms on Freelancer. This also exemplifies the highly individualized nature 
of labor on the platform (Coyle 2017; Duggan et al. 2019), where it is up to the 
individual worker to get booked for work. Not until Frederic achieved a better score 
was he in a position to raise his rate. On platforms that allow workers to set their 
own rates, several of our participants reported raising their rate after having obtained 
a number of tasks. The performative effects of the system become visible in Frederic’s 
strategic actions of taking tasks at a low rate to accommodate a platform that values 
a high turnover. Yet, although Frederic learned how to earn a better ranking when 
he bid on a task, it remained uncertain whether he would be chosen for the work. 
Additionally, despite having some knowledge about the algorithm and the factors it 
considered in calculating rankings, Frederic still did not know exactly how his score 
was calculated:
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Frederic:  Next to each freelancer you see a dollar sign that indicates their turnover 
through the platform. 8.4 is just a number stating that he has a higher 
turnover than someone with 8.3.
Interviewer:  It is from 0–10 or what?
Frederic:  I have no idea. I don’t know how high it goes. I imagine that it is infinite, but 
I also believe the scale is logarithmic … I don’t know, but just by completing 
a well-paid job, you will get a score of 1.3. My rating, for instance, is 5.9. 
But I have no idea if that is high or low.
Frederic’s score fed into his ranking, directly influencing his opportunities for obtaining 
tasks and maintaining an income. However, the way this score was calculated was 
‘illegible’ to him (Sennett 1998). This demonstrates the selectiveness of the platforms 
in what information they provide to their workers (Shapiro 2018), exposing them to a 
platform logic that seems obscure and unfair.
The two examples above illustrate how algorithmic management, which matches 
workers and customers, calculates scores and determines the order in which workers 
are displayed to customers, was experienced as non-transparent by the workers. Various 
parameters feed into the platforms’ ranking of the workers, who can experiment with 
different actions to increase their visibility on the platform, for example, taking tasks at 
a low rate to increase their score or detailing their qualifications in the profile text. This 
system remains implicitly unpredictable for the workers in terms of incoming tasks, and 
it puts them in constant competition with the other workers (Prassl 2018; Wood et al. 
2018). The unpredictability in obtaining tasks may limit the workers’ control as regards 
long-term planning and maintaining an income (Garben 2017; Standing 2016).
4.2 Control while the work is carried out: workers’ responses 
Control in the examples above is exerted before workers perform the paid work. On 
the food delivery app Wolt, control is exerted while the paid work is being carried out. 
As described in table 2, the workers download a Wolt partner app on their smartphone, 
where they sign up for shifts within a specific timeframe, or they can log on anytime and 
be paid per delivery. When the couriers sign in to work, the app directs them to food 
pick-up locations through GPS tracking. Viktor explained how it works:
Viktor:  You’re in the app and then it says, ‘X has ordered takeaway on this address’. 
It refers to the restaurant. Then I bike to the restaurant and click that I have 
the food and then a new location pops up, which is the customer’s address. 
Then I bike over there, deliver the food and say ‘Enjoy your meal’. Then I go 
downstairs again, and when I am outside, I click ‘I have delivered the food’, 
and then a new order pops up. This is how it works.
The algorithms on the Wolt app automatically distribute pick-ups among the active 
workers. During a shift, the app guides the courier through the city for different pick-ups 
and deliveries. Thus, the algorithm explicitly dictates which deliveries the couriers must 
take, and hence their route, that is, where exactly they move from and to, and there-
fore how many kilometers they bike during a shift, which is often in the range of 40 to 
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45 kilometers. While Wolt couriers have the freedom and flexibility to decide when they 
wish to work, once they are active on the app, they have little control over the details of 
the work, that is, the delivery orders they must take. This is controlled by the algorithms, 
which decide the task allocation as the orders come in from customers. Couriers cannot 
reject a delivery; their only option is to click ‘I’m on it’. Viktor explained: ‘You just have 
to follow the app. The app controls everything’. Unlike other digital platforms where the 
customer can choose the worker, or on other courier apps where the courier can reject 
orders (Shapiro 2018; Veen et al. 2019), on the Wolt app the matching of worker and 
customer is solely determined by the algorithm that allocates the deliveries.
During a shift, the Wolt courier has consecutive deliveries to different customers. 
The algorithm does not provide the courier with the full details about a delivery, but 
only discloses the specific information the worker needs at a given time during a delivery. 
Control of the courier is meticulously exerted step by step during the execution of 
their work, exemplifying how non-transparency is built into algorithmic management 
(Rosenblat & Stark 2016; Shapiro 2018).
The number of deliveries couriers make per hour influences how much they earn. 
The hourly wage of couriers who complete three deliveries in an hour increases from 
€14.70 to €16.3 While Wolt couriers do not receive the full information about an assigned 
delivery from the outset of the delivery, Viktor particularly viewed the distribution of 
pick-ups between active couriers as non-transparent and he felt that the logic of the 
algorithm on the Wolt app sometimes worked against him. Viktor speculated:
Viktor:  The [app] controls where we bike, and which orders I have to pick up. 
But I have wondered if [Wolt] sometimes directs me to a place further 
away because then they would save money on me. The popular food places 
receive orders all the time. And it makes the most sense [for Wolt] to choose 
a restaurant that I am close to, because that is more efficient for Wolt. But 
even though I am right next to the popular food place, then suddenly it is a 
completely different restaurant I have to bike to. But then again, you have 
no intel about [how pick-ups are distributed].
Viktor felt it was unfair, and perhaps intentional, when he was assigned a distant route 
just as he was about to increase his hourly wage. Yet he was unable to know for certain, 
as information about route distribution remained inaccessible to him.
The prospect of increasing the hourly wage functions as an incentive for workers. On 
Wolt, there is no ranking system or ratings of the individual couriers. Instead, the promise 
of increased monetary gain seems to discipline workers towards effective delivery of the 
food. The prospect of a higher wage may incentivize couriers to bike faster, as was the 
case for Viktor. While Wolt’s system does not explicitly encourage couriers to bike faster, 
the prospect of monetary gain may incentivize risky behavior among the couriers, thereby 
increasing the risk of accidents. This becomes especially risky when cycling rapidly through 
traffic without a helmet, with one hand on the bike handlebars and their phone in the other.
In addition to non-transparency regarding the allocation of delivery routes, Vik-
tor also found the calculation of his wages obscure. When he requested an explanation 
from Wolt support about the specifics of these calculations, Viktor received a standard 
reply about how Wolt generally calculates courier wages. The continued unavailability 
of insight into significant aspects of his work was a point of frustration: ‘The app might 
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as well trick me for money each shift … without me being able to know it, because this 
information is unattainable’. While Viktor wanted greater transparency, he viewed non-
transparency as a precondition of working via an app in an easily attainable job.
Although he experienced a high degree of control in choosing his courier shifts,4 
Viktor had a low degree of control over the specific delivery tasks he had to perform 
while working. This differs from other platforms where workers have the freedom to 
decide how they perform the work, for example, dog walking or translation, and they 
are usually not under surveillance by the platforms at this stage. However, researchers 
found that Upwork, a platform similar to Freelancer, takes screenshots of the workers’ 
screen every 10 minutes to monitor that the workers are working (Jarrahi et al. 2019; 
Wood et al. 2018). This can be viewed as the platforms trying to maintain control over 
the workers’ execution of the task.
The following section analyses worker responses to a third form of control on 
digital platforms, which is exerted at the end of a task.
4.3  Control exerted through evaluations and ratings:  
workers’ responses
Customer ratings are embedded in many algorithmic management systems after the com-
pletion of tasks. By utilizing ratings, and often also reviews of workers, platforms delegate 
the management task of evaluating workers to the customers. These ratings can signifi-
cantly impact a worker’s ability to obtain tasks (Sutherland et al. 2019; Wood et al. 2018). 
Almost all of our interviewees expressed the opinion that ratings significantly affected 
their bookings. Hans, who worked via Hilfr, said: ‘I have received more bookings after the 
first [stars and reviews] appeared’. It took six months before Hans received his first book-
ing. Not until after he received a positive rating from the first customer, did the frequency 
of bookings increase. Ratings are often a parameter feeding into the algorithmic ranking 
of workers on these platforms, as Frederic explained concerning the algorithm on Free-
lancer. However, whether the delayed success in obtaining gigs on Hilfr, as experienced by 
Hans, was due to algorithmic ranking, customer preferences for already rated workers, or 
a combination of the two is unclear. During the provision of services such as cleaning and 
dog walking, platforms cannot monitor how the workers carry out the work; ratings thus 
serve as a control mechanism that provide the platforms with an assessment of the work 
performed. The ‘mediating power of the rating system’ disciplines and motivates workers 
towards certain behaviors (Rosenblat & Stark 2016, p. 3772).
While ranking and rating systems discipline workers to act in ways that are desirable 
for the platform, there are examples of workers finding ways to work around the system 
and thereby regain some autonomy over their work (Jarrahi & Sutherland 2019; Wood 
et al. 2018). Like Hans, Frederic experienced that his ratings on Freelancer impacted the 
probability of obtaining tasks on the platform, which drove him to make several efforts 
to maintain strong ratings. If Frederic deemed a bad rating inevitable, he employed a 
tactic to circumvent the publication of that rating:
Frederic:  Both reviews will only be published when we’ve both evaluated each other. 
This allows you to be strategic if you’ve worked for an idiot. (…) So, if I don’t 
evaluate [the customer], the evaluation I received never becomes public. 
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Like platform workers in similar studies, Frederic figured out a method for gaming the 
system and avoiding ratings he anticipated would be negative. An alternative tactic uti-
lized by 27-year-old solo self-employed Vera, who worked via the high-skilled freelancer 
platform Worksome, was to always confirm alignment of expectations with her custom-
ers before completing a gig, thereby ensuring a top rating from the customer. When 
platform workers have no manager to contact and no official way to gain influence and 
control in their work life, this elicits strategic actions among the workers. Accordingly, 
24-year-old Charlotte, who worked as a waiter via the platform Chabber, explained that 
she did not understand how the rating system worked which affected her behavior: 
Charlotte:  In the beginning, I thought the restaurants could see how I rated them, so  
I was very careful, like: ‘I have to give them good ratings if I want good 
ratings.’
Later Charlotte learned that ratings must be reciprocal before they are published. 
Where the examples of control mechanisms operating before and during the work 
illustrate how non-transparency is embedded in the platforms’ operations in these stages, 
in the case of ratings, the workers are very aware of how their rating influences their 
access to jobs and they therefore deploy various tactics to maintain a good rating. The 
decentralized control of the workers through algorithms and customer ratings means 
that if a rating is deemed unfair, the workers have no manager they can contact to 
remedy its influence on their job opportunities, which moves power away from the 
workers (Duggan et al. 2019). 
4.4 Worker experiences: The invisible manager
As managerial control is delegated to algorithms, workers are rarely in contact with 
human managers. They tell about a labor market where they receive no help and sup-
port during their work. Neither do they become part of long-term work communities. 
 Gandini problematizes this ‘as organizational models that ‘invisibilize’ the managerial 
figure (…) and prevent workers from socializing with each other, thus reducing the 
potential for resistance and unionization’ (Gandini 2019, p. 1051).
Consequently, all the young people included in this article have highly individual-
ized working conditions, but this is very rarely something they problematize themselves. 
Many of the young workers in our empirical study described how easy it was to start 
working via the digital platforms. This is something they appreciate. However, they also 
described Gandini (2019)’s invisibility of the leadership figure, which resulted in little 
or no contact with a human leader, which the young people perceived as strange in that 
they only interacted with a technical system, such as an app or a web page. ‘It is strange 
to have an employer who is so invisible’, said Ditte who worked on Dogley. Hans, who 
obtained cleaning gigs via the platform Hilfr, similarly stated that having an online 
 platform as intermediary sometimes left him feeling isolated in the work:
Interviewer:  Do you see any issues with working this way [via a digital platform]?
Hans:  Hmm … Perhaps this aspect of being a bit far away if you need help or …
Interviewer:  Far away from whom?
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Hans:  Well, even though they [Hilfr support] are quick to answer over the web, it 
doesn’t feel like real people you [interact] with. 
When Hans was in the home of customers, he sometimes felt left to his own devices. 
He felt that the technology added a distance, and even when engaging with support it 
did not feel like interaction with a human manager. Also speaking on this element of 
distance, Viktor, who worked via the food-delivery platform Wolt, said, ‘I actually don’t 
know who I work for. It’s just an app (laughs) … It’s a bit strange’. Despite feeling alone 
in their work, Ditte, Hans and the other young workers in our study viewed the absence 
of a boss, telling them when to work or what to do, as a form of freedom and flexibility. 
Hans, for instance explained ‘It is so easy to choose when to work and to fit it around 
my studies’. Frederic emphasized the option to work from anywhere, which particularly 
pertains to the platforms with online work:
Frederic:  We were in Malta a few years ago. That was possible because I worked 
3 hours every morning. In that way I was able to gain an income while 
we were on holiday. I got up at 7 a clock, translated on the terrace, we eat 
breakfast and then I went up and translated again, and from 10 o’clock we 
were on vacation. (…) I really felt a freedom to be able to do that.
While workers on digital platforms have a great deal of flexibility compared to more 
traditional jobs, ‘new structures of power and control’ (Sennett 1998, p. 47) built into 
the platforms’ algorithmic management systems condition the autonomy of platform 
workers in different ways, as we have seen in the analysis. Still, the young workers in our 
study proclaim that they enjoy a freedom in the gig work. We discuss below the paradox 
between platform control mechanisms and the experience of flexibility and freedom.
5 The double autonomy paradox
Digital labor platforms promise autonomy to workers (Möhlmann & Zalmanson 2017; 
Prassl 2018), but in line with other studies our study shows that worker autonomy 
is constrained by the digital platforms’ algorithmic management systems in various 
ways, which do not offer the young workers an option of dialogue or insight. This 
poses an autonomy paradox as the platforms inhibit the autonomy they promise 
workers (Möhlmann & Zalmanson 2017). Kalleberg et al.’s (2009, p. 103) definition of 
autonomy as the absence from ‘control by technical means’ emphasizes the tension that 
exists between algorithmic management and the promise of autonomy. 
Across the platforms included in this study, the control mechanisms embedded in 
the algorithmic management systems restricted the autonomy of the young workers 
regarding influence and insight into the platforms. Specifically, our findings show how 
workers lacked control in deciding critical aspects of the work, such as the distribution 
of delivery routes and rankings on the platforms, giving rise to feelings of unfairness, 
and demonstrate how the workers’ control over processes in the work is constrained 
(Sennett 1998). In Sennett’s (1998) work, employees become confused because ‘illegible’ 
technologies have overtaken a majority of the job functions. On digital platforms, where 
consecutive tasks or gigs replace regular jobs, machines have not taken over the manual 
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labor but rather the managerial functions surrounding the manual labor: the matching, 
ranking, and allocation of tasks, which takes place before, during and after the perfor-
mance of the tasks. The obscurity of these processes leaves workers bewildered, and 
our findings show that the experience of non-transparency is consistent among young 
 workers across different digital platforms.
However, in the narratives of the young workers, they also stress the importance of 
the flexible work-life where they can be ‘their own boss’, and for this reason, the non-
transparency experienced by the young workers seems to be an insignificant trade-off 
to make for this freedom. How can the young workers experience such a high sense of 
freedom in their work, when they, at the same time, are tightly controlled, before, during, 
and after execution of a task? We suggest that these seemingly conflicting narratives 
represent a double autonomy paradox. It is a double paradox because despite the 
control mechanisms that create non-transparency and impede the autonomy promised 
by platforms, the young workers in our study experience the work as being highly 
flexible and they feel they have autonomy in choosing when and when not to work. This 
latter aspect seems to be the most important form of autonomy for the group of young 
workers in this study, and has also been reported among young student workers in retail 
trade (Nielsen et al. 2013). 
The limited reflections recorded in this study regarding autonomy and the working 
environment are, however, not surprising, as young workers, many of whom are still 
students, often have a short-term perspective in their work and therefore rarely reflect 
on their working environment (Nielsen et al. 2013, 2018, 2019). For many of these 
young people, work may not be their primary activity or their primary income, as they 
are in different phases of transition from school to work (Nielsen & Laursen 2020). 
Thus they might have a more instrumental relationship to the work, where flexibility 
vis-á-vis other activities might be the most important.
6 Discussion
This study has shown that young workers on digital platforms experience a sense of 
autonomy in that they can choose when to work. However, they also expressed a lack of 
autonomy with regard to gaining insight into the inner workings of the platforms and the 
distribution of tasks which were linked to feelings of an unfair algorithmic management 
system and opaque remuneration of work tasks. Building on previous research on 
algorithmic management and the autonomy paradox, the present study suggests that 
the conflicting perceptions of control and autonomy among young people in platform 
work constitute a ‘double autonomy paradox’. Similar types of paradoxes, such as self-
management and control structures embedded in new forms of labor processes, are well-
known in the broad labor process debate (Smith & Thompson 1998).
We have suggested distinguishing control mechanisms that operate at different 
stages of the labor process: before workers get booked for a task, by controlling how 
workers are ranked/made visible on the platform compared to other workers; during 
the work as workers carry out the task, by algorithmically distributing deliveries, for 
example; and after the work is done, by having customers evaluate and rate workers, 
which often influences the worker’s ranking on the platform and hence their access to 
tasks. In our study, we identified examples of platforms that use control mechanisms 
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before and after the work, or while the work is carried out. However, some studies 
report platforms attempting control at every stage of the labor process (Jarrahi et al. 
2019; Wood et al. 2018). 
This paper therefore contributes to the emerging body of literature investigating 
worker experiences of algorithmic management on digital platforms, with insights into 
control mechanisms and experiences of autonomy among young workers in Denmark. 
British youth researchers found that young workers’ participation in the gig economy 
is motivated by the lack of alternative jobs, and that gig work is a part of a precarious, 
insecure and long-lasting life condition. In contrast to this, the majority of the young 
workers in the present study merely used platform work as a supplementary activity for 
income generation. 
The Danish context is significant in this regard. Compared with the rest of Europe, 
Denmark has relatively high rates of employment among young people and relatively 
high levels of education. Moreover, social security measures in Denmark mean that fail-
ing to find employment does not have quite as far-reaching negative consequences as 
in countries lacking such levels of state-run social security (Nielsen et al. 2018). In this 
way, the young workers in Denmark are not in the same precarious situation as young 
workers in the UK, as reported by MacDonald & Giazitzoglu (2019). The workers in 
our study are comparable to Dunn’s (2020) ‘short-timers’ who are neither financially 
dependent nor emotionally invested in their work on the digital platforms.
Thus, the significant Danish context might be a supplementary explanation for our 
finding that young Danish workers’ experiences of high autonomy and flexibility rest on 
their ability to organize for themselves when and where they wish to work, by applying 
for the specific tasks they want and only accepting the bookings that fit their schedule. 
As such, they experience autonomy in timing, even though whether they get booked for 
work is unpredictable. These young people may have developed a more instrumental 
relationship with working on digital platforms, where flexibility in relation to their 
primary activities, such as their education, is the most crucial thing for them. We should 
thus be cautious in extending the findings of this study to other groups of young people, 
particularly where platform work is the primary activity and income.
However, it is clear that young people in the Danish context still experience a lack 
of control and autonomy and a feeling of unfairness when working on digital plat-
forms, and this might affect health and well-being at work. The algorithmic manage-
ment and the invisibility of the manager (Gandini 2019) mean that the young workers 
have limited contact with a human manager. Several of the young workers included 
in this study mentioned this and found it odd that there was no ‘real’ manager. They 
experienced an unfairness of the algorithmic management system, that worked one-
way. Some of them also spoke of the lack of colleagues and a workplace commu-
nity. From previous research, we know that this can lead to social isolation (Garben 
2017; Wood et al. 2018), have a negative impact on well-being (Duggan et al. 2019), 
and leave them vulnerable when they are performing tasks in other people’s home 
(Moore 2018).
For these reasons, we suggest that algorithmic management poses a concern for 
the working environment on digital platforms in a Danish context, especially for young 
workers who are at higher risk in their work, partly because they have less experience 
when the work is not their primary occupation. However, there is a lack of empirical 
data on the health and well-being consequences for young workers on digital platforms. 
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Although this study has revealed important mechanisms and possible connections 
between algorithmic management and the work environment on digital platforms, 
future research must take a closer look at the specific consequences of algorithmic man-
agement on worker health and well-being.
7 Conclusion
While the young workers in our study enjoyed the flexibility offered by the platform 
work, their experiences of non-transparency led to feelings of unfairness and 
disorientation relating to the algorithmic management system. When the manager 
is invisible and control is embedded in a non-transparent algorithmic management 
system, the young workers have nowhere to turn to get help and instructions. It is 
well-known that lack of control and overview in one’s work can negatively impact 
the working environment and pose risks for health and well-being. This in particular 
applies to young workers, who are especially vulnerable since they are new on the 
labor market, are working part-time, and are usually not well integrated into the social 
network related to the workplace. For this reason, it is important to pay attention to – 
and perhaps mitigate – how the use of algorithmic management fosters experiences of 
non-transparency, invisible managers, and limited control over the work processes, as 
this may negatively impact young workers’ well-being. Research that investigates the 
relationship between algorithmic management and workers’ health and well-being on 
digital platforms is encouraged.
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Notes
1  The interviews come from two different research projects. Ten of the interviews are from 
a project focusing on young workers on digital platforms in Denmark conducted in 2018–
2019. The other project is from 2017 focusing on young workers with ‘atypical jobs’ in 
the Nordic countries (Scheuer 2014). In accordance with the focus of this article, we only 
included the two interviews from the Nordic project that were with Danish workers on 
digital platforms. 
2  All quotes are translated from Danish, and the names and personal identifiers of the 
participants have been altered to ensure their anonymity. Participants’ personal data is 
handled in accordance with GDPR (European Parliament and The Council of the European 
Union 2016).
3  This was the salary as reported by our participants in 2019. Wolt might have adjusted 
their salary since then. At the beginning of 2021, they adjusted their bonus scheme during 
weekends, which was protested by workers (Gjoni 2021).
4  Twice a week at specific times, Wolt-couriers are able to choose their shifts for the coming 
week. Since many couriers may be interested in these shifts, workers must often be ready 
and very quick once the shifts are released to get their desired shifts.
